Mereja.Forum

[Abe Abraham]

• The secession of Kurdistan .. the battle that ended before it began!
  
  Hatem Karim Al Falahi
  
  
  Military Escalation in Kirkuk
  Tehran and the Kurdistan Crisis
  Erbil's Possible Options
  
  The unilateral step taken by the Kurdish leadership in the Kurdistan region of Iraq on September 25, by organizing a referendum on secession from Baghdad, has achieved; This leadership achieved very great popularity at the internal level, but it was fraught with risks and uncalculated challenges.
  
  The Kurdish leadership ignored the assessment of the reaction to its decision, so the internal Iraqi and international rejection (the United Nations, the European Union and the Arab League) was clear and supportive of the official position of the Iraqi government. As for the position of the regional neighbors, it was coordinated despite their many internal differences, and firmly supported the federal government in Baghdad. He was accompanied by a threatening tone and a threat to use force if necessary.
  
  Thus, these countries agreed on several measures to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, which included organizing joint military maneuvers on the Iraqi-Turkish and Iranian borders, besieging the Kurdistan region of Iraq economically, closing border crossings with it and handing them over to the government, closing the region’s airspace, and threatening to stop the export of oil through his lands.
  
  The Iraqi government's actions were based on the Iraqi constitution in implementing its provisions using soft policy, by imposing a package of economic and political sanctions on the region.
  
  Military Escalation in Kirkuk
  
  Baghdad refused to hold dialogue with the Kurdistan Regional Government unless the referendum was retracted or its results were cancelled. The military escalation began clearly through mutual procedures between the two parties when the regional government refused to hand over airports and border crossings to the federal government.
  
  This was accompanied by the recapture of the city of Hawija by Baghdad from the Islamic State; Thus, many military forces were emptied, and the government had striking forces capable of maneuvering and carrying out the duties entrusted to it. These forces include the fight against terrorism, the Federal Police, the Rapid Response Forces, and the Popular Mobilization Forces.
  
  

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  Baghdad refused to hold dialogue with the Kurdistan Regional Government unless the referendum was retracted or its results were cancelled, and the military escalation began clearly through mutual procedures between the two parties when the regional government refused to hand over airports and border crossings to the federal government

  
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  Some of these forces clashed with the Kurdish Peshmerga forces in Tuz Khurmatu on October 14, and this was the beginning of a military escalation between the two parties that was accompanied by an initiative to resolve the crisis led by President Fuad Masum (who is a Kurd) and consisted of six points, namely:
  
  1- The delivery of Kirkuk airport (Al-Hurriya base).
  2- Kiwan camp handover.
  3- Handing over oil fields and wells to the federal government.
  4- Handing over ISIS prisoners to the federal government.
  5- Changing the governor of Kirkuk.
  6- The withdrawal of the Peshmerga forces to the borders of the Blue Line, which they were in before June 9, 2014.
  
  The Kurdistan Regional Government also rejected this initiative, and here came the meeting of the Iraqi "Ministerial Council for National Security", considering that the mobilization of elements from outside the Kirkuk security system was a declaration of war on the Iraqis, and this was a clear indication of the possibility of the federal government using military force, which actually happened last evening October 15.
  
  The government forces began advancing towards the city of Kirkuk in agreement with the Peshmerga forces of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, according to an agreement between the commander of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Major General Qassem Soleimani, and the Kurdish leaders in Sulaymaniyah.
  
  The forces entered Kirkuk without a fight after a complete withdrawal of the Peshmerga forces, and they reached their goals set by controlling the entire city. Then it set out to restore the disputed areas and to form a joint administration in them to act upon the orders of the federal government in Baghdad, so Jalawla, Sinjar, and Tuz Khurmatu were seized.
  
  Tehran and the Kurdistan Crisis
  
  Demonstrations erupted inside Iran, organized by Iranian Kurds in support of the referendum move in Iraqi Kurdistan, and lasted for several days, which embarrassed the Iranian government, which suppressed these demonstrations, and seriously thought about the danger of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq that would develop national sentiment among Iranian Kurds and pose a threat to national security.
  
  In addition, Tehran accuses the Kurdistan region of Iraq of having been a training site for ISIS militants who blew up the Iranian Shura Council and Khomeini's mausoleum last June. It also announced its fear that Israel would acquire military bases in Kurdistan that would constitute a direct threat to its lands.
  
  Tehran has goals that it wants to achieve in the near term from the Iraqi Kurdistan crisis, which is to weaken the hegemony of the region’s president, Massoud Barzani, as he is a strategic ally of the United States of America, and to strengthen its strategic Kurdish ally, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and to strengthen the control of the Iraqi government, which is dominated by its allies from Iraq’s Shiites and which Iran considers one of Countries of the "Resistance Alliance".
  
  As for the distant goals of the Iranian move in Iraqi Kurdistan; It ends the Kurdish secession project by preventing the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq that may constitute an obstacle to the Iranian Silk Road, which extends from Shirin Palace in northwestern Iran to Iraq (Khanaqin, Sharqat, Tal Afar, Sinjar) and passes through the city of Mayadin in Syria, from which it proceeds to the southern suburbs of Beirut in Lebanon. Down to the shore of the Mediterranean.
  
  

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  Tehran has goals that it wants to achieve in the near term from the Iraqi Kurdistan crisis, which is to weaken the hegemony of the region’s president, Massoud Barzani, as he is a strategic ally of the United States of America, and to strengthen its strategic Kurdish ally, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and to strengthen the control of the Iraqi government, which is dominated by its allies from Iraq’s Shiites and which Iran considers one of Countries of the "Resistance Alliance"
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  And some of these areas - which the road passes through - are controlled by the Peshmerga forces and are located in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, which poses a threat to the Iranian project in the region in the long run, and affects the field performance of the Iranian and Iraqi militias fighting in Syria. Thus, it can be said that the road from Tehran to the southern suburbs (Hezbollah's stronghold) is now open and will not be affected by any obstacles.
  
  Iran wanted - by employing the Kurdistan crisis - to strike Barzani and curb his influence after he would have become a national leader had he completed the project of secession from Baghdad, as he embarrassed his partners in the region by supporting the referendum, apparently for fear of a public reaction to them, and working inwardly to undermine What will come of it later.
  
  Iran here wanted to re-impose the control of its strategic partner (the Talabani family) over Kirkuk, which would have become the main artery for financing the desired “Kurdistan state.” Returning the city to the control of the federal government is considered an end to the secession project at the present time, as it is not possible to establish a Kurdistan state without Kirkuk and its economic resources. .
  
  This was indicated by Ali Akbar Velayati when he said, "The defeat of the Kurds in Kirkuk thwarted Massoud Barzani's plot," stressing that Barzani's goal - and behind him the Zionist entity - was to control Kirkuk's oil wells.
  
  The visits made by Major General Qassem Soleimani to decision-making centers in Baghdad and Kurdistan, and his meeting with leaders of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan to offer condolences on the death of former Iraqi President Jalal Talabani; It had a major role in the recent decisive events in Kirkuk, as he advised them to avoid military confrontation with government forces, and to agree with the Baghdad government to pull the rug out from Barzani.
  
  This was stated by Representative Alaa Talabani, who clarified the size of the internal differences between the Kurdish parties regarding the position on the referendum project and the secession of Iraqi Kurdistan, which prompted the National Union Party to agree with the federal government on several important points, including: handing over the city without fighting and forming a joint administration for it, and handing over Oil fields of the federal government.
  
  As well as withdrawing from the disputed areas to the borders prior to June 9, 2014, with the government pledging to pay the salaries of employees and the Peshmerga forces, pledging to open Sulaymaniyah Airport to flights, and establishing a region that includes Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk and Halabja. Thus, the Iranian role is very clear in splitting the Kurdish ranks, and bringing the views of some of them closer to the federal government.
  
  Erbil's Possible Options
  
  All options for the Kurdish leadership in Erbil are considered difficult and complicated, especially after it lost control of Kirkuk, which is the most important strategic city in the region due to its economic and logistical importance.
  
  Among the options available to the Erbil government are:
  
  1- The option of military escalation: a choice that would be catastrophic and difficult for Erbil, which lost the military battle before it began, following the splitting of the Kurdish ranks when the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan - which fully controls Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk - refused the military option, and handed over Kirkuk to the Baghdad government without a fight. After he withdrew from his positions according to the agreement concluded between them, which was sponsored by Iran.
  
  The military option may open the doors of external interference wide in the presence of an environment completely hostile to Erbil, and there are serious threats to use force by Turkey and Iran if Erbil insists on secession from Iraq.
  
  Therefore, I rule out the Erbil government resorting to this option after the recent developments, but this does not prevent the occurrence of some sporadic clashes in some areas, and the possibility of internal fighting between the Kurdish parties remains unless the outstanding issues between them are resolved.
  
  

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  Dialogue remains the possible and safest way to solve outstanding problems, such as Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution issued after the US invasion in 2003, related to solving the issue of Kirkuk and the "disputed areas", with a focus on maintaining Iraqi territorial integrity and commitment to the constitution.
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  2- The option of dialogue and retreat: It is a likely option for Erbil due to the internal crisis in the region and the international and regional rejection of the referendum move, due to which it erred in its internal and external accounts, the balance of profit and loss, and anticipation of reactions.
  
  Note that there is pressure exerted on the KRG largely by Turkey, Iran and the federal government, aimed at forcing the Kurdish leadership to accept joint administration of the disputed areas, as well as the border crossings and airports that will be under the control of the federal government.
  
  Dialogue remains the possible and safest way to solve outstanding problems, such as Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution issued in 2005 after the US invasion of Iraq, which is related to resolving the issue of Kirkuk and the "disputed areas", with a focus on maintaining Iraqi territorial integrity and adhering to the constitution.
  
  This option will cost the Kurdish leadership a lot because it is a political suicide as a result of the leadership's insistence on this referendum step, which has made it lose many of the great privileges it has obtained since 1991.
  
  3- The option to stick to the position: This means increasing internal and external pressures, with a complete inability of the administration of the region to carry out its duties towards its people, which will cause a major rift in the social incubator, and this may lead to negative repercussions on the Kurdish leaders who failed to maintain what they have done Escalatory steps with the central government, with increasing external pressure from Turkey and Iran with economic and political sanctions.
  
  This will make the region lose the initiative and unable to face any expected military action, and this is one of the most difficult options that Erbil faces, and therefore I do not think that it will resort to this option because losing a part is better than losing the whole.
  
  4- The option of civil war: The internal dispute in the Kurdistan region could lead to its division into two regions, i.e. there will be a power struggle between the Kurdish parties to control the region’s cities, and this opens wide options regarding the internal fighting, and this division can be as follows:
  
  A - Sulaymaniyah / Kirkuk / Halabja: It is controlled by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which was previously divided into several wings, affiliated with figures such as Barham Salih, Kosrat Rasul and Hero Talabani (wife of the late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani), and is rivaled by the Kurdish Change Movement Party.
  
  B - Erbil / Dohuk region: controlled by the Kurdistan Democratic Party - led by Barzani - who will be almost completely besieged and without resources. The Kurdistan Democratic Party must take full control of the region, and thus Iran will control Iraq, which will harm the US/Turkish axis in the region.